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Conceptual processing relies on the per-
ceptual system, and, as such, percep-
tion affects conception. Many studies
have demonstrated perceptual-conceptual
interference, where perceptual stimulation
in a particular modality leads to slower
and/or less accurate conceptual process-
ing of information from the samemodality
(e.g., Kaschak et al., 2005, 2006; Vermeulen
et al., 2008). However, many other studies
have demonstrated perceptual-conceptual
facilitation, where perceptual stimulation
leads to faster and/or more accurate con-
ceptual processing in the same modality
(Kaschak et al., 2006; van Dantzig et al.,
2008; Connell et al., 2012; Connell and
Lynott, in preparation).
At first glance, this apparent dis-
crepancy seems like a serious problem
for accounts of simulation-based con-
cepts. Such theories hold that offline
representations—that is, representations
of objects and events that are not in the
current environment (Wilson, 2002)—are
functionally comprised of partial replays
(i.e., simulations) of the neural activation
captured during perceptual, motor, affec-
tive, and other experience (Barsalou, 1999,
2008; Glenberg and Gallese, 2012; Connell
and Lynott, submitted). If conceptual rep-
resentations therefore require modality-
specific perceptual simulation, then why
do they not consistently interact with per-
ception? Why does perceptual stimulation
sometimes impair and sometimes facilitate
conceptual processing?
One account proposed that the differ-
ence lies in whether perceptual stimulation
is concurrent with the conceptual task or
precedes it, and whether or not the percep-
tual stimulus can be easily integrated into
the simulation required by the conceptual
task (Kaschak et al., 2005). According to
this account, interference occurs when a
concurrent perceptual stimulus cannot be
integrated into the simulation required by
the conceptual task. For example, Kaschak
and colleagues argued that an upward-
scrolling visual display could not be eas-
ily integrated with the sentence The cat
climbed the tree, and hence interfered with
its simulation. Facilitation occurs when
a perceptual stimulus can be easily inte-
grated into a simulation, regardless of
whether the perceptual and conceptual
components of the trial are presented con-
currently or sequentially. For example, an
image of a car would facilitate understand-
ing a sentence like The car approached you.
However, this account cannot easily
explain later findings. For example, con-
current tactile stimulation, in the form of
vibrations to the palms and fingers, facil-
itates people’s ability to judge the size of
manipulable objects (Connell et al., 2012).
Vibrotactile stimulation seems at least as
distant from object representations of wal-
lets and keys as upward-scrolling lines are
from a cat climbing a tree. Yet, even though
both perceptual stimuli appear “noninte-
gratible,” the former produced facilitation
and the latter interference.
ROLE OF ATTENTION
We propose that these apparently dis-
crepant effects can be resolved if one con-
siders the attentional demands each task
places on modality-specific processing.
The perceptual and attentional systems
are intertwined, and, since the conceptual
and perceptual systems share modality-
specific neural substrates, it should come
as no surprise that they also share associ-
ated attentional mechanisms (e.g., Pecher
et al., 2003; Connell and Lynott, 2010).
Interference emerges when the percep-
tual stimulus occupies attention and leaves
few resources free for simulation pur-
poses. For example, a moving stimulus
changes over time, and, as such, con-
tinuously captures attention in order to
monitor its motion. Because a percep-
tual stimulus automatically directs exoge-
nous attention toward that modality (e.g.,
Spence et al., 2001), processing a chang-
ing percept will wrest attention away from
simulating in that modality and lead to
interference effects. Conscious perceptual
imagery, such as manipulation or mem-
ory rehearsal of perceptual information,
will also occupy modality-specific atten-
tional resources, and hence interfere with
simulation in that modality.
In contrast, facilitation emerges when
the perceptual stimulus directs attention
toward a particular perceptual modality
but leaves adequate resources free for sim-
ulation purposes. Selectively attending to
a particular perceptual modality, even in
the absence of a target, increases activation
in the corresponding sensory cortex at the
expense of other modalities (Foxe et al.,
2005; Mozolic et al., 2008; Langner et al.,
2011). That is, attention alone can pre-
activate modality-specific perceptual sys-
tems so that subsequent target processing
in that modality is facilitated. All else being
equal, perceptual processing is hence faster
in an attended than an unattended modal-
ity (Spence et al., 2000, 2001; Töllner et al.,
2009).
In principle, both interference and
facilitation can happen in concurrent
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and sequential presentation paradigms.
For example, if a perceptual stimulus
is presented concurrently with a con-
ceptual task, it would interfere if it
changes over time and continuously occu-
pies attentional resources in that modality
and would facilitate if it doesn’t change
and instead leaves that modality in an
attentionally primed state. Similarly, if
a perceptual stimulus has completed its
presentation before a conceptual task, it
would interfere if it is still occupying atten-
tional resources and would facilitate if it
no longer occupies attentional resources.
Moreover, the sensory cortices are not
homogenous, but rather contain some
degree of feature specialization. In the
visual modality, for instance, upward and
downward motion are processed in dif-
ferent cell assemblies in the visual cortex
(Mather et al., 1998), and attending to a
particular direction of motion can increase
activation in that direction-specific detec-
tor (Kamitami and Tong, 2006). As such,
attentional effects can operate at either a
whole-modality or a feature-specific level.
OVERVIEW OF EFFECTS
It is important, when disentangling facili-
tation and interference effects, to compare
like with like. For that reason, we focus
here on studies that (1) combine percep-
tual stimulation with a linguistic concep-
tual task and (2) measure responses to the
linguistic conceptual task.
INTERFERENCE
A number of studies have shown
interference effects because perceptual
stimulation occupies attention in that
modality, leaving insufficient resources for
simulation.
In a concurrent paradigm, Kaschak
et al. (2006: Experiments 1, 3) presented
an auditory motion stimulus (i.e., an
auditory illusion where the source of
the sound appears to change location:
upwards, downwards, towards or away)
while participants read sentences onscreen
that described auditorymotion in a partic-
ular direction (e.g., The jet pack roared into
the sky). People were slower to judge the
sentences as sensible when they described
the same direction of motion as the per-
ceptual stimulus. Here, the motion in the
perceptual stimulus meant that it contin-
uously grabbed auditory attention as it
changed over time. Auditory attention was
therefore occupied in monitoring motion
in a particular direction, and so there
were insufficient attentional resources free
when the sentence called for auditory sim-
ulation of motion in the same direction.
Hence, the perceptual stimulus interfered
with conceptual processing. The same
account applies to Kaschak et al.’s (2005)
studies of visual motion.
In a sequential presentation paradigm,
Vermeulen et al. (2008) asked participants
to first memorise auditory or visual stim-
uli (e.g., a series of visual shapes), then
respond to a modality-specific property
verification question (e.g., lemon can be
yellow), and finally judge if another per-
ceptual stimulus had been presented at the
start of the trial. They found that prop-
erty verification was slower when peo-
ple held a perceptual memory load in
the same modality. Here, although the
perceptual and conceptual stimuli were
presented in sequence, perceptual and
conceptual processing effectively occurred
concurrently because the memory load
required imagistic rehearsal (i.e., con-
scious and effortful simulation) of the
perceptual stimulus. In other words, the
memory load task occupied modality-
specific attentional resources, and so inter-
fered with conceptual processing in that
modality.
FACILITATION
Several other studies have shown facilita-
tion effects because the perceptual stim-
ulus directed attention to a particular
perceptual modality without occupying
resources.
In a concurrent paradigm, Kaschak
et al. (2006: Experiments 2, 3) asked par-
ticipants to listen to sentences over head-
phones that described auditory motion
in a particular direction (e.g., The jet
pack roared into the sky) while, in the
background of the spoken sentence, an
auditory motion stimulus was played.
People were faster to judge that sen-
tences were sensible when they described
motion in the same direction as the audi-
tory stimulus. Here, participants actually
experienced two auditory stimuli: a per-
ceptual stimulus of auditory motion and
a speech stream delivering information
for the linguistic conceptual task. Since
the task goal of sensibility judgement
required participants to listen closely to
the sentence, their auditory attention was
occupied by the speech stream and not by
monitoring perceptual motion. As such,
the perceptual stimulus directed attention
toward motion in a particular direction,
and hence facilitated simulation of audi-
tory motion in that direction. These find-
ings contrast with the interference effects
found for auditory motion in the same
paper when the sentences were presented
in visual (text) form. When the perceptual
motion stimulus is the only thing pre-
sented in that modality, attention will be
occupied in monitoring its change over
time, and simulation of same-direction
motion in that modality will suffer from
insufficient resources. But when the per-
ceptual motion stimulus is presented in
the same modality as a goal-relevant
stimulus (i.e., something that requires a
response, such as a sentence that must
be judged as sensible or not), then the
latter stimulus will have attentional pri-
ority. The perceptual motion will be per-
ceived but not monitored—meaning it
directs attention but does not continue
to occupy it—and so simulation of same-
direction motion in that modality will be
easier (see also Zwaan and Taylor, 2006;
Experiments 3, 5).
In a different concurrent paradigm, we
stimulated people’s hands or feet with tac-
tile vibrations while asking them to com-
pare the size of manipulable objects (e.g.,
Which is bigger? wallet or key: Connell
et al., 2012). People were faster to name
the relevant object when their hands were
stimulated compared to their feet. Because
the vibrotactile stimulation was constant
and unchanging, it did not require mon-
itoring and simply directed attention to
the tactile modality in a somatotopic
manner (i.e., the hand or foot area of
the somatosensory cortex). Tactile stim-
ulation to the hands therefore facilitated
conceptual processing of objects whose
simulations contained hand-related tac-
tile information, while having no effect
on objects whose representations did not
include this information (e.g., yacht).
The same effects emerged for proprio-
ceptive stimulation. In other words, per-
ceptual stimulation directed attention to
modality-specific, body-specific systems
and made simulation of such information
easier.
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Perceptual attention does not have to
be directed by an exogenous stimulus but
can also be endogenously directed as part
of the implicit demands of a task. In
recent work, we hypothesized that read-
ing is, in effect, a concurrent paradigm
of perceptual and conceptual processing.
Both lexical decision and naming tasks
involve recognition of visual word forms,
and, as such, implicitly direct attention
to the visual modality. Hence, we found
that strongly visual words (i.e., refer-
ring to concepts with a strong visual
component) have faster and more accu-
rate lexical decision and naming times
than weakly visual words, even when
other variables such as length and fre-
quency have been controlled (Connell and
Lynott, in preparation). Furthermore, say-
ing the same words aloud in a naming
task, where the goal is correct pronunci-
ation, also directs attention to the audi-
tory modality. As a result, strongly audi-
tory words are named more quickly and
accurately than weakly auditory words.
Indeed, such modality-specific attentional
priming effects may be one of the main
underlying reasons for concreteness effects
in reading tasks (Connell and Lynott,
2012).
Finally, in a sequential paradigm, van
Dantzig et al. (2008) asked participants to
respond to a perceptual stimulus (visual
light, auditory white noise, tactile vibra-
tion) and then to a property verifica-
tion task (e.g., visual broccoli is green).
People were faster to verify a property
in the same modality as the preceding
perceptual stimulus. Here, the percep-
tual stimulus directed attention toward
its modality but did not require any
further resources once the response was
made, which meant that subsequent con-
ceptual processing in that modality was
facilitated (see also Vermeulen et al.,
2009).
WHAT ABOUT ACTION?
Similar combinations of facilitation and
interference effects have been observed
in studies of action and motor simula-
tion, but we do not address them here
because these studies tend to differ from
those of perceptual simulation in one
key respect. Perceptual simulation stud-
ies like those discussed above measure
their dependent variable on a response
act that is unrelated to the experimen-
tal manipulation (e.g., pushing a but-
ton, speaking aloud). In contrast, motor
simulation studies typically involve mea-
suring motor responses to action-related
words and sentences (e.g., Glenberg and
Kaschak, 2002; Boulenger et al., 2006;
Zwaan and Taylor, 2006; Kaschak and
Borreggine, 2008), and, as such, measure
their dependent variable on a response
act that is a function of the experimental
manipulation. The net result of combin-
ing the manipulated and response modal-
ities is to render it difficult to sepa-
rate the effects of simulation on action
from the effects of action on simu-
lation, and to make the allocation of
attentional resources susceptible to sub-
tle differences in timing. By illustration,
effects vary between interference and facil-
itation depending on the point in time
that participants are made aware of the
required action (Kaschak and Borreggine,
2008), the tense of verbs employed in the
linguistic conceptual task (de Vega et al.,
2004; Bergen and Wheeler, 2010), and the
possibility of having to interrupt an action
mid-execution (Boulenger et al., 2006).
For these reasons, the picture of facilita-
tion and interference effects inmost motor
simulation studies is more complex and
variable than that in perceptual stimula-
tion studies.
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